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1   Two of the earliest critics to write about Soviet performance art were Boris Groys in his 
seminal essay “Moscow Romantic Conceptualism,” A-Ya 1 (1979): 1–13; and Margarita 
Tupitsyn, “Some Russian Performances,” High Performance 4, no. 4 (Winter 1981–82): 
11–18. By unoffi cial I am referring to art of the 1960s–80s that was not recognized or sup-
ported by offi cial Soviet artists’ unions and therefore received limited opportunities for 
exhibition prior to 1976. The formation of an “unoffi cial artists’ union” (the Painting 
Section of the Gorkom Grafi kov) in 1976 altered this situation somewhat, though mem-
bers of the Moscow conceptualist circle continued to perform, exhibit, circulate, and dis-
cuss their works primarily through personal networks rather than in state-sponsored 
gallery spaces. For a more detailed discussion of “unoffi cial art,” see Ilya Kabakov, 
60-e–70-e . . . Zapiski o neofi tsial’noi zhizni v Moskve (Moscow: NLO, 2008), 60–62. 
For a detailed chronology of this period, see I. Alpatova, L. Talochkin, and N. Tamruchi, 
“Drugoe iskusstvo”: Moskva, 1956–1988 (Moscow: Galart, 2005).
pErFormancE in thE 1970s
The explosion of performance art in Moscow in the 1970s should 
not be separated from the broad range of conceptualist tendencies 
then prevalent in many corners of that city’s unoffi cial art world.1 
Scholarship on Moscow conceptualism has largely concentrated on the 
genres of albums, paintings, and objects and on the more open-ended 
categories of installations and projects to frame discussions of such 
common themes as artistic marginality, the mythological cast of Soviet 
ideological language, and the failure of utopian histories. These object-
based and often deeply text-centered genres have played a central role 
in the historiographic foregrounding of the literary tone of Moscow 
conceptualist practice, as, for example, in the use of invented characters 
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2   The literature on Moscow conceptualism has grown considerably in the past decade.  
See, for example, Alla Rosenfeld, ed., Moscow Conceptualism in Context (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Zimmerli Art Museum at Rutgers University, 2011); Matthew Jesse Jackson, The 
Experimental Group: Ilya Kabakov, Moscow Conceptualism, Soviet Avant-Gardes (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010); Boris Groys, History Becomes Form: Moscow 
Conceptualism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010); Victor Tupitsyn, The Museological 
Unconscious: Communal (Post)modernism in Russia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009); 
Boris Groys, Max Hollein, and Manuel Fontán del Junco, eds., Total Enlightenment: 
Conceptual Art in Moscow, 1960–1990 (Ostfildern, Germany: Hatje Cantz, 2008); and 
Ekaterina Degot and Vadim Zakharov, Moskovskii kontseptualizm (Moscow: WAM, 2005).
3   See, for example, Ekaterina Bobrinskaia, “Moscow Conceptual Performance Art in the 
1970s,” in Rosenfeld, Moscow Conceptualism in Context, 154–77.
4   Collective Actions (Kollektivnye deistviia) consisted, at various times, of Andrei 
Monastyrski, Nikita Alekseev, George Kiesewalter, Nikolai Panitkov, Igor Makarevich, 
Elena Elagina, Sergei Romashko, and Sabine Hänsgen. Lev Rubinstein took part in the 
first action, Appearance, but did not participate as an organizer thereafter. The name 
Collective Actions first appeared as azioni collettive in a section heading of the exhibition 
catalogue for the unofficial Soviet art section of the 1977 Venice Biennale. It was later 
applied to the group itself by Groys in the essay “Moscow Romantic Conceptualism.” For 
the sake of clarity, I will employ the name throughout, even though it postdates a number 
of the group’s early actions. For more on Collective Actions’ early history, see George 
Kiesewalter (pseud. Givi Kordiashvili), “Istoriia ‘Kollektivnykh deistvii’: Povest’ v dvukh 
chastiakh s epilogom,” in Kollektivnye deistviia, Poezdki za gorod, vols. 2–3 (Vologda, 
Russia: BMK, 2011), 125–43.
or the meta-interpretation of the artwork as text.2 More recent efforts to 
locate performance among the variety of Moscow conceptualist idioms, 
however, are beginning to shed light on other artistic considerations.3 
Such hybrid works as Komar and Melamid’s installation-performance 
Paradise/Pantheon (1973), Ilya Kabakov’s studio readings of albums, 
the Nest group’s Hatch Eggs! intervention at the 1975 VDNKh Palace 
of Culture exhibition, Rimma and Valery Gerlovin’s “games” staged  
for the camera, and many others, while in themselves highly literary, 
were also central to critically elaborating issues specific to perfor-
mance, such as its time-based character, the presence of the artist’s 
body and/or persona, the experience of live action and participation in 
social space, and questions of ephemerality, documentation, and the 
location of the art object and the aesthetic event in Moscow conceptual-
ist discourse.
In the spring of 1976, a pair of poets, an artist, and a student of 
languages staged what would become the first of many outdoor concep-
tual actions carried out by the Collective Actions group in the course of 
the next three decades.4 Conceiving the events as a new form of poetry 
reading and responding to the work of John Cage, the organizers of 
these works began to invite audiences to fields and forests on the edge 













that often consisted of material so minimal that viewers were not 
always sure that they had witnessed anything at all, or whether what 
they witnessed had concluded.5 By involving audiences directly in the 
realization of actions in a variety of ways, Collective Actions stretched 
the meaning of artistic spectatorship and participation at a time when 
the conditions under which unofficial Soviet artists could exhibit had 
undergone a number of challenges and contestations.6 Moreover, 
the group’s growing body of documentary materials—from textual 
descriptions to photographs, audio and video recordings, audience rec-
ollections, charts, maps, and various other means of capturing and 
conveying their “trips out of town”—soon became yet another site of 
the group’s unfolding practice.7 The actions, their documentation, the 
many post-action discussions that took place among the audiences and 
organizers, and the theoretical texts that sprang up in their wake all 
5   On Cage’s reception in the Soviet Union, see N. K. Drozdetskaia, “Idei Dzhona Keidzha v 
Sovetskom andergraunde 70-80-kh godov: Ot kontseptualistov i postmodernistov do 
rokerov i Mit’kov,” in Dzhon Keidzh: K 90-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia, ed. Yu. V. Moskva 
(Moscow: Moskovskaia Gosudarstvennaia konservatoriia im. P. I. Chaikovskogo, 2004), 
141–47.
6   On some of these events, see Laura Hoptman and Tomáš Pospiszyl, eds., Primary 
Documents: A Sourcebook for Eastern and Central European Art since the 1950s (New York: 
Museum of Modern Art, 2002), 65–77; on the connection of Moscow conceptualism to 
exhibition history, see Yelena Kalinsky, “Invisible Exhibitions: Performance & the 
Archive in Moscow Conceptualism,” in “The Invisible History of Exhibitions,” special 
issue, Galerija Nova Newspapers 19/20 (July 2009): 31–36; for a discussion of participa-
tion in Collective Actions, see Claire Bishop, “Zones of Indistinguishability: Collective 
Actions Group and Participatory Art,” e-flux Journal 29 (November 2011), accessed 
July 15, 2012, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/zones-of-indistinguishability-collective-actions
 -group-and-participatory-art/.
7   As I will discuss in detail in this essay, Collective Actions consisted of prolific documen-
tarians and theorizers of their own practice. These materials were collected in periodi-
cally self-published volumes, called Poezdki za gorod (or Trips out of town), beginning in 
1980. These were compiled in Kollektivnye deistviia, Poezdki za gorod, vols. 1–5 (Moscow: 
Ad Marginem, 1998); and later in Kollektivnye deistviia, Poezdki za gorod, vols. 6–11 
(Vologda, Russia: BMK, 2008); Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1 (Vologda, Russia: BMK, 2011); 
and Poezdki za gorod, vols. 2–3 (Vologda, Russia: BMK, 2011). Additionally, many of 
Collective Actions’ documentary materials can be found at two online portals dedicated 
to Moscow conceptualism: conceptualism.letov.ru/KD-ACTIONS.htm and http://www
.conceptualism-moscow.org/page?id=173&lang=en (both accessed July 23, 2012). My 
forthcoming dissertation, “Collective Actions: Moscow Conceptualism, Performance, and 
the Archive, 1976–1989,” deals with the group’s Soviet-era history; for a consideration of 
Collective Actions in light of the Soviet Union’s transition into the Russian Federation, 
see Octavian Eşanu, “Transition in Post-Soviet Art: ‘Collective Actions’ Before and After 
1989” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2009). All citations to published Collective Actions 
materials are from the two 2011 Vologda editions of Poezdki za gorod, available online 






























became regular mainstays of artistic life within the Moscow conceptu-
alist circle, and formed a key locus for the articulation of Moscow con-
ceptualist discourse in the second half of the 1970s and 1980s.
Keeping this context in mind, the present essay will trace a provi-
sional history of Collective Actions’ first five years (1976–81), taking as 
a guide the three critical terms action (aktsiia), documentation (doku-
mentatsiia), and factography ( faktografiia), which came to figure promi-
nently in the group’s emerging understanding of its aesthetic project.  
It was in these years that the investigation of spatiotemporal perception 
in Collective Actions’ iconic early actions was at its most intense. The 
simultaneous production of textual and photographic documentation 
challenged the primacy of spatiotemporal experience as a necessary 
condition of action. At issue in this dialectic, I will argue, was the very 
definition of aesthetic experience and, by extension, Moscow conceptu-
alism’s relationship to its audience, the proper site of exhibition, and 
the movement’s institutionalization in the form of a dispersed multi-
media archive and hermetic group discourse. Through a close reading 
of several of Collective Actions’ performances and key theoretical writ-
ings from this period, a set of philosophical and artistic concerns can 
be discerned that give insight into the specific stakes of performance as 
an artistic practice within Moscow conceptualism.8
8   As I will explain in the following section, from 1977, Collective Actions used the term 
action (aktsiia) to describe their activities in the field. Following this, I use “action” (or 
“the action”) to refer to individual works in the group’s canon. However, I depart from 
Collective Actions’ usage when I discuss their work in the context of “performance” or 
“performance art” in order to indicate the group’s practice within broader discourses and 
practices of performance in Moscow and around the world in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
distinction between “action” and “performance” is an important and strategic one for 
Collective Actions. As Amelia Jones has demonstrated in the case of the strategic use of 
“body art” by American artists of the 1960s and 1970s, the distinction demonstrates a 
desire to envision a practice that deviated from that indicated by the term performance at 
the time. In Collective Actions’ case, the term action was meant to emphasize the con-
structed nature of the work as a text unfolding in time and space, and to de-emphasize 
the theatrical or intersubjective aspects implied by performance. To consider actions 
within the history of European and American performance art of the 1960s–80s, how-
ever, as I suggest here, is an attempt on my part to enlarge that history beyond the usual 
borders of Western Europe and North America. This expanded history, in turn, stands to 
open new avenues within prevailing theoretical discussions of performance, such as the 
important discussion regarding the relationship of performance and documentation. To 
suggest, as Monastyrski and Collective Actions eventually did, that certain types of facto-
graphic objects and photographs approach the status of action is to envision other possi-
bilities of performance, ones that do not rely on the artist’s or performer’s presence 
expressed theatrically or intersubjectively and are instead located in the viewer’s engage-
ment with the performance as a text that unfolds not only in the dimensions of time and 













Early FiEld actions and thE aEsthEticization oF rEality
The first action took place on the morning of March 13, 1976. Thirty 
viewers were invited to Izmailovsky Park (the site of the groundbreak-
ing Second Fall Outdoor Exhibition of unofficial art eighteen months 
earlier) to witness something described only as Appearance.9 The view-
ers were met at the metro station by one of the action’s organizers and 
led to an empty, snow-covered field bordered on all sides by a forest. 
They assembled by the forest’s edge and waited. After several minutes, 
two figures appeared from the opposite side of the field and began to 
walk in the direction of the group. Upon reaching the audience, they 
began to distribute typewritten “Documentary Certificates,” attesting 
to each viewer’s presence as a witness to Appearance. Another action 
took place two weeks later, one more occurred in the fall, and, although 
a group practice had not been foreseen at the start, around twenty 
actions were carried out over the next five years.10
The actions of the early period can be divided into two types: those 
with an audience and those with only the organizers present.11 When 
audiences were present, they received invitations or were invited by  
telephone to an unspecified event with only the time, place, and title of 
the action given ahead of time. They traveled alone or in groups to the 
determined meeting spot, which often required a ride on a commuter 
  See also Amelia Jones, Body Art/Performing the Subject (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998), 13.
9   The Izmailovsky Park show took place on September 29, 1974, two weeks after the con-
tentious Bulldozer show, and was the first uninterrupted public exhibition of unofficial 
Soviet art in Moscow. See materials in Hoptman and Pospiszyl, Primary Documents, 70.
10   For descriptions of actions, documentary photographs, and other documentary and  
theoretical texts, see the volumes of Poezdki za gorod and materials online. See also the 
English translations of audience recollections from this early period in Yelena Kalinsky, 
ed. and trans., Collective Actions: Audience Recollections from the First Five Years, 1976–
1981 (Chicago: Soberscove Press, 2012).
11   My division here is practical and aims to sketch a great variety of actions in very general 
terms. In fact, different members of Collective Actions categorized actions in many dif-
ferent ways at various moments, as, for example, “paratheatrical actions” versus “medita-
tive exercises” (“Obschchii kommentarii,” 1977; this and the following texts can be found 
in Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1); actions that use the principle of “empty action” versus actions 
for an anonymous audience that function outside the conventional boundaries of the 
action’s demonstrational time (“Kommentarii,” July 30, 1978); actions with audiences and 
without (Monastyrski, “Kratkii kommentarii k aktsiiam 1976–1979 gg.,” June 26, 1979; 
Alekseev, “Kommentarii k kratkomu kommentariiu A. Monastyrskogo,” July 11, 1979); 
actions consisting of movement toward or away from the viewer or a theatrical trick ver-
sus actions that make use of objects, the leaving of items in nature, or the stimulation of 
consciousness without theatrical tricks (Alekseev, “O kollektivnykh i individual’nykh  





























Collective Actions, Appearance, March 13, 1976. Documentary photograph. (Audience 
assembling in the field.) Image courtesy of Andrei Monastyrski. © Collective Actions.
Collective Actions, Appearance, March 13, 1976. Documentary photograph. (Two figures 
appearing in the distance.) Image courtesy of Andrei Monastyrski. © Collective Actions.
Collective Actions, Appearance, March 13, 1976. Documentary Certificate (typed text). 













train followed by a walk or a bus ride from the station to the field. Once 
there, they witnessed or participated in some activity in the field, such 
as watching figures appear in the distance, listening to the sound of a 
ringing bell buried in the snow, pulling a rope out of the forest, blow-
ing up balloons into a large fabric membrane to send down the river, or 
being photographed at various points along the field.12 Actions where 
no audiences apart from the organizers themselves were present some-
times involved the installation of an item, such as a slogan or a tent 
constructed out of painted canvases, in nature and its abandonment  
for anonymous passersby to encounter.13 At other times, the organizers 
created particular phenomenological conditions that prompted them  
to meditate on their own perceptions.14 Actions with audiences usually 
concluded with the distribution of a Documentary Certificate or 
another souvenir object, or simply with no further instructions and  
the dispersal of the viewers on their own initiative. Many actions of 
both types segued into informal opportunities to socialize, group 
strolls in nature, or friendly gatherings at a nearby dacha.
As George Kiesewalter explains in his pseudonymous early history 
of the group, the term action (aktsiia) was not the only or exclusive term 
used to describe the group’s events in these years; rather, the actions 
were referred to as, among other things, stagings (postanovki), more 
rarely performances (performansy), or simply things (veshchi) or works 
(raboty).15 One of Collective Actions’ earliest programmatic texts dis-
cusses them as situations (situatsii).16 This terminological looseness 
reflects the initially unfixed, multivalent nature of Collective Actions’ 
undertakings. One of the first uses of the term action appears in 1976 
in connection with Appearance and Lieblich, the group’s first two works. 
Here, the authors declare actions to be “a new form of public reading,” 
or “in some sense, seminars . . . whose main goal is the development of 
12   The described actions are Appearance, March 13, 1976; Lieblich, April 2, 1976; Time of 
Action, October 15, 1978; The Sphere, June 15, 1977; and Place of Action, October 7, 1979.
13   These might include Slogan-1977, January 26, 1977; Slogan-1978, April 9, 1978; For 
G. Kiesewalter (Slogan-1980), April 13, 1980; and The Tent, October 2, 1976.
14   This category might consist of The Lantern, November 15, 1977; For N. Panitkov (The 
Three Darknesses), February 17, 1980; and For A. Monastyrski, March 16, 1980.
15   In fact, Monastyrski, Rubinstein, and Alekseev had planned Appearance as a one-time 
event with no intention of carrying out any further actions. It was only with the third 
action, The Tent, which Alekseev had invented and proposed as a collective work, that a 
“group consciousness” began to emerge. Kiesewalter, “Istoriia,” 130.





























potential forms of spiritual contact between us all.”17 As art historian 
Ekaterina Bobrinskaia points out, Moscow conceptualist performance 
was in many ways an outgrowth of existing practices of concrete 
poetry, conceptual poetry, and poetry readings.18 Instead of recited ver-
bal texts, works like Appearance and Lieblich offered viewers situations 
that unfolded in both time and space in an attempt at what Rubinstein 
called an “aestheticization of reality” (estetizatsiia deistvitel’nosti).19 They 
thus became a form of poetic text or aesthetic object akin to those pre-
sented and discussed at the readings and seminars that took place in 
the circle’s apartments and studios in the 1960s and 1970s.20 The 
explicit association of actions, readings, and seminars with the “devel-
opment of potential forms of spiritual contact” between organizers  
and viewers reminds us of the important role played by such regular 
gatherings in Moscow’s cultural life in the post-Stalinist period.21 It 
also reflects Collective Actions’ aspirations, at some level, that their 
“situations” occupy a similar place as a regular site of communitas 
within the Moscow conceptualist milieu.
Just as the terminology of action remained fluid in Collective 
Actions’ early years, so is there an accompanying ambiguity in the early 
texts about the exact nature of action itself. There is a nascent tension, 
already inherent in the association of actions with poetry, between the 
actions as aesthetic objects and actions as social practice, sites of com-
munal feeling, or spiritual exercises. Were actions, like poems and art-
works, subject to formal analysis? Or were they instead closer to social 
gatherings, “enthusiasms,” or “festivities that we sometimes organize 
17   “Fragment 1976 goda” (1976), Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1, 147. This text was likely written 
sometime between April and October 1976 since it does not mention the third action,  
The Tent of October 2.
18   Bobrinskaia, “Moscow Conceptual Performance Art,” 155–57. Monastyrski and 
Rubinstein, who together invented the first action, Appearance, were poets.
19   Kiesewalter, “Istoriia,” 128. Monastyrski had earlier developed a series of action objects 
called Elementary Poetry, which worked to direct the viewer’s attention to her or his own 
position through an engagement with the object. See, for example, The Pile or The 
Cannon (both 1975) in Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1, 97–98, 344–47.
20   Seminars in private studios and apartments often included poetry readings, lectures, 
musical performances, and presentations of new work by artists. See Kabakov’s descrip-
tion of his studio seminars in 60-e–70-e, 120; on the Chachko seminars, see Boris Groys 
and Antony Vidokle, “Art beyond the Art Market,” in East Art Map: Contemporary Art and 
Eastern Europe, ed. IRWIN (London: Afterall, 2006), 403–4; and Nikita Alekseev, Riady 
pamiati (Moscow: NLO, 2008), 106–7.
21   On the cultural significance of poetry readings and discussion groups for the postwar  
intelligentsia, see, for example, Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian 













for ourselves”?22 Certain passages in the texts reflect an interest in 
formalist or structuralist thinking, and were no doubt informed by  
such writers as Viktor Shklovsky and Ferdinand de Saussure, whose 
works were at this time either circulating in samizdat or beginning to 
be published.23 Such objectives as “breaking down the opposition of 
‘reader-listener’” or “maintaining distance . . . by means of constantly 
new forms of action,” pronounced in Collective Actions’ earliest texts, 
envisioned actions as possessing both inherent aesthetic functions and 
art historical trajectories that unfold over time and must be maintained 
through deliberate aesthetic strategies from action to action.24
The crux of this ambivalence may be perceived in a statement from 
1977, where the authors declare that “the true value of our work can  
be grasped only within the narrow circle of friends, whose dissolution 
will also bring about the end of this work’s reality, whereas that which 
appears meaningful in the annals of art carries for us a negative, even  
if formative, significance.”25 This statement concisely frames a major 
theoretical and practical problem that would soon arise in Collective 
Actions’ practice, and which can be seen to resonate through much 
postwar performance art: namely, the location of performance (ephem-
eral action experienced by a group of viewers) and the possibility of  
performance’s documentation and preservation in the annals of art  
history.26 Here, in 1977, Collective Actions seem to stand clearly on the 
side of ephemerality, denying any “reality” to actions outside the shared 
experience of those in the “narrow circle” who are present at the events. 
And yet, the final statement regarding art historical considerations at 
22   In “Fragment 1976 goda,” the authors suggest that actions were “little subject to struc-
tural analysis” (147); and another early text, “Fragment 1977 goda,” makes use of “enthu-
siasms” and “festivities.” See “Fragment 1977 goda,” Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1, 148.
23   The roles of Russian formalism, structural linguistics, and semiotics in Collective 
Actions’ theoretical writings or in Moscow conceptualism more broadly are subjects that 
demand a fuller treatment than is possible in the present article. On discussions of struc-
turalism and semiotics among the Collective Actions circle, see Alekseev, Riady pamiati, 
104, 175. On the Tartu School of Semiotics in the Soviet Union, another source of struc-
turalist thinking, see Maxim Waldstein, The Soviet Empire of Signs: A History of the Tartu 
School of Semiotics (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008).
24  “Fragment 1976 goda.”
25  “Fragment 1977 goda,” 148.
26   These questions have shaped much of the literature on performance art since the 1970s, 
with the status of the photograph a particularly contentious issue. A good reference is the 
four-volume anthology Performance: Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies, ed. 
Philip Auslander (London: Routledge, 2003). The most compelling treatment, to my 
mind, remains Amelia Jones’s “‘Presence’ in Absentia: Experiencing Performance as 





























once forecloses such a narrow reading. For while they disavow art his-
torical judgment (“that which appears meaningful in the annals of 
art”), the authors concede that established artistic categories have a  
formative ( formoobrazuiushchii, literally “form-determining”) signifi-
cance, thereby implicitly placing actions in the category of artistic 
works with formal properties and histories.
documEntation and thE Factographic objEct
With art historical framing envisioned as an inevitable and even, in a 
sense, formative cultural process, documentation, the main mecha-
nism of that process, was at the same time assumed as being secondary 
with respect to action. In a 1977 “General Commentary,” for example, 
the group insists that the only “adequate reception” of an action is “unme- 
diated participation.” The reader of documentary materials must “keep 
in mind the double distance between the objects [in the field] and the  
viewers [of the documentation].” The series of mediations—from  
spatiotemporal action to photograph or text to the viewer or reader  
of the document—“gives rise to an artificial contextualism that,  
unfortunately, cannot be avoided.”27 In the early years, the business 
of documenting actions was treated entirely pragmatically, and short 
descriptive texts, photographs, and occasionally videos were produced 
for the purposes of publicity and the dissemination of actions outside 
of Moscow and the Soviet Union.28 It should be noted, however, that 
the idea of purposely not documenting so as to avoid the distortion of 
distance and false contextualism does not seem to have been raised.
While documents served a secondary, practical function in the  
early years, the rhetoric of the document was present as an aesthetic 
strategy or formal device from the very first action in the form of the 
27   “Obshchii kommentarii” (1977), Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1, 151. The same skepticism regard-
ing documentation’s ability to adequately convey the true experience of action recurs 
again and again in the group’s texts from the first five years.
28   See, for example, some of the earliest documents (photographs and descriptive texts)  
published abroad in Ilaria Bignamini, “From the U.S.S.R.,” Flash Art: The International 
Arts Review 76/77 (July–August 1977): 16–18. Letters and images sent to Victor and 
Margarita Tupitsyn served as primary sources in their writing on unofficial Soviet art, 
including Margarita Tupitsyn’s article on Russian performance. See the correspondence 
between the Tupitsyns and Monastyrski in Victor Tupitsyn and Margarita Tupitsyn, 
Moskva–N’iu-Iork (Moscow: WAM, 2006). The Dodge Archive at the Zimmerli Art 
Museum at Rutgers University contains typewritten action descriptions in folded book-
lets that likely predate the publication of the first volume of Poezdki za gorod and were 














29   The term device (priem) appears repeatedly in Collective Actions’ writings. It is likely that 
Collective Actions, a group of poets and artists familiar with the writings of the Russian  
formalists, borrowed the term from them.
30   See Boris Groys, “Text as a Ready-Made Object,” in Endquote, ed. Marina Balina, Nancy 
Condee, and Evgeny Dobrenko (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2000),  
32–45.
31   Gerald Janecek, “Lev Rubinshtein’s Early Conceptualism,” in Balina, Condee, and 
Dobrenko, Endquote, 112.
32   Ibid., 114, 119. The quotation is from Rubinstein’s “Ocherednaia programma” (1975), 
reprinted in Domashnee muzitsirovanie (Moscow: NLO, 2000), 15–23.
Documentary Certificate.29 If Appearance was first envisioned as a new 
form of public reading, then the Documentary Certificate might be  
considered alongside recent moves in conceptual poetry. Its use of the 
wooden language of Soviet bureaucracy, for example, might associate  
it with the mid-1970s work of Lev Rubinstein and Dmitri Prigov, who 
introduced Soviet language as a ready-made element into simple poetic 
forms like serial index cards or texts affixed to tin cans.30 In his essay 
on Rubinstein’s index-card poems of the mid-1970s, Gerald Janecek 
suggests that they are “empty texts . . . devoid of concrete content.”31 In 
the process of being recited—an act that involved the author turning 
over the cards and reading them aloud one by one—such phrases as 
“nothing happens” become “events in themselves, illustrating the 
impossibility of talking about ‘nothing,’” and thus “provide models  
of the creative situation, the literary-reading situation, the role of the 
author,” and so on.32 A similar thing takes place with the Documentary 
Certificate. The evidentiary function purported by the text (“documen-
tary certificate / that ________ / was a witness to / APPEARANCE, / 
which took place on March 13, 1976.”) directs viewers’ attention to their 
own participation in the action and competes with the experience of 
intensified looking that had been taking place up to that point. Before 
receiving the certificate, viewers positioned on the edge of an empty 
field found themselves engaged in an experience of spectatorship, 
wherein gazing at the appearance of two figures in the distance and 
their passage from far to near might have itself been taken as sufficient 
material to constitute an action. The certificate’s redirection of the 
viewers’ attention from pure spatiotemporal perception to the meta-
level of linguistic and evidentiary representation (“so-and-so was  
a witness”) both challenges the primacy of action with respect to  
documentation and suggests a way in which the document, like 





























33  Kiesewalter, “Istoriia,” 134.
34  Igor Makarevich, correspondence with the author, June 6, 2012.
The inclusion of artists Igor Makarevich and Elena Elagina as con-
tributing members of Collective Actions with the action Place of Action 
(October 7, 1979) greatly expanded both the volume of documentation 
and its function within Collective Actions’ work. As Kiesewalter writes, 
Place of Action was in large part motivated by Makarevich’s ability to 
obtain photographic equipment (two additional Leica cameras) and 
materials, as well as his access to studio space.33 Makarevich describes 
his and Elagina’s participation in the group:
Lena and I became familiar with Collective Actions’ activities in 
1979, and the first action in which we took part was Place of Action. 
I was wildly interested in everything that was taking place and, 
with all the energy of a neophyte, gave free rein to my photogra-
pher’s appetite. As a result, hundreds of photographs were pro-
duced, exceeding many times over the [group’s] existing norms  
of representing actions.34
The number of photographs created in the course of Place of Action 
did indeed exceed all of the group’s previous benchmarks, from several 
or several dozen to several hundred. But this excess of representation 
was not only a question of enthusiastic production. Many of the photo-
graphs created during Place of Action introduced a new function for 
documentary photography beyond the evidentiary. For the first time, 
photography itself, like the Documentary Certificate, participated in 
the realization of action as a constructive element of the action itself, 
competing with the viewers’ experience of pure spatiotemporal percep-
tion, and not as a parallel practice directed toward creating secondary 
materials for an absent reader.
Place of Action was the most structurally complex action that the 
group had put forward up to that point. In it, thirty people were invited 
to a large field and instructed, one by one, to move along an imaginary 
line along the field. They were asked to stop at each of fifteen num-
bered markers and turn to face the starting line, where an organizer 
with a camera would take a picture. Between the thirteenth and four-
teenth stops, each viewer-participant encountered a curtain strung 
between two poles and, after moving behind the curtain, another 













Collective Actions, Place of Action, October 7, 1979. Documentary 
photographs. (Figure photographed at increasing intervals.)  





























traded places, and the person with the camera took a picture of the par-
ticipant now lying in the ditch. Relinquishing the camera, the partici-
pant heretofore lying in the ditch now continued along the path to be 
photographed at the remaining two positions.35 At the conclusion of the 
action, viewers found themselves in a forested area at the far end of the 
field. There, a large signboard hanging on a tree illustrated the complex 
schema of the various camera and viewer positions during the action, 
and organizers waited with a tape recorder to capture the viewers’ 
impressions. As Makarevich recalls, the newly available technical 
means of documenting actions provided by his and Elagina’s positions 
35   Makarevich’s enthusiastic account of his role as photographer might be seen to contradict 
the way photography actually functions in Place of Action. Two of the three cameras used 
in the action operated “mechanically,” one stationary, shooting the receding figures  
from the starting line; the other passed back and forth between viewer-participants at  
the curtain and capturing the arrival and departure of each person in the ditch. Only 
Makarevich with his roving camera was able to choose which shots to take of the overall 
scene and individual details. The coexistence of both photographic functions (the artist-
photographer and the mechanical/automatic camera eye) suggests the group’s ability to 
sustain a number of different conceptions of artistic practice at this time. The use to 
which Makarevich’s “artistic” photographs were put in Monastyrski’s slide film compli-
cates the picture further.
Collective Actions, Place of Action, October 7, 1979. Documentary 














within the Soviet art bureaucracy were “handily put to use by Andrei 
[Monastyrski], and we acquired new ways of capturing the proceed-
ings.”36 The resulting multimedia archive of Place of Action consisted 
of photographs taken by the two cameras directly involved in the action 
(in the field at the starting position and at the curtain), additional  
photographs of participants and organizers taken by a third camera,  
the audiotape recordings of responses in the forest, as well as a slide 
show and photographic display (what is referred in the action descrip-
tion as the “black-and-white exposition”) based on all of these mate- 
rials presented at a separate gathering in Makarevich’s studio three 
weeks later.
It was around this time that the term factographic appeared in 
Collective Actions’ theoretical discourse. In his “Brief Commentary on 
the Actions of 1976–1979,” produced several months prior to Place of 
Action, Monastyrski lists what he considers to be the objects that 
function as “factographic documentation” in each of the actions up  
36  Makarevich, correspondence with the author, June 6, 2012.
Collective Actions, Place of Action, October 31, 1979. Slide show and 
postaction discussion in the studio of Igor Makarevich. Photograph. 





























to that point.37 Here he includes the Documentary Certificate from 
Appearance, a similar certificate attached to a piece of the rope pulled 
out in Time of Action, the colored paper constructions created and dis-
tributed in the course of Pictures, and a descriptive text that was to have 
been distributed in the unrealized action Twins. Distributed to viewers 
at the conclusion of actions, these items served as either souvenir-
objects or evidence of actions having taken place (particularly the  
rope, which, like a contact relic, seems to promise direct access to the 
action through its materiality). However, the list does not end there; 
Monastyrski also includes “objects that have been left at the place  
of action,” such as the ringing bell in Lieblich, the banners hung in 
Slogan-1977 and Slogan-1978, the balloons sent down the river in The 
Sphere, and others.38 This second category of “factographic” objects, 
according to Monastyrski, “continued to act for some time after the par-
ticipants’ contact with them during their creation.”39 Once again desta-
bilizing the notion of action being located in direct audience experience 
(“public readings,” “festivities,” “stagings”), Monastyrski envisions  
a new location for action in the factographic object, as it might be 
encountered by an unnamed, anonymous viewer at an indeterminate 
time in the future.
In his response to Monastyrski, Nikita Alekseev proposed a more 
restrictive definition of factography, one in which the document or 
object plays a constructive role in the action’s realization (he includes 
the Documentary Certificate of Appearance and the colored paper con-
structions of Pictures in this conception).40 The passage of a docu-
ment “from our hands into the viewers’ hands” did not, in Alekseev’s 
opinion, properly constitute the “semantics of factological documen- 
tation.” Rather, a factographic document becomes one by “directly  
37   Monastyrski refers to “the semantics of factographic documentation.” Andrei 
Monastyrski, “Kratkii kommentarii k aktsiiam 1976–1979 gg.” (June 26, 1979), Poezdki 
za gorod, vol. 1, 159.
38   Ibid. The others listed are the constructed painted-canvas tent in The Tent, the swinging 
violet lantern in The Lantern, and Nikita Alekseev’s rope-maze construction in his indi-
vidual work The Spiral.
39  Ibid.
40   In Pictures, viewer-participants received 144 envelopes of various colors and sizes con-
taining inscriptions referring to the conditions of the action (weather, time, place, etc.) 
and were then invited to lay out these envelopes in a line in the snow. As they inspected 
the inscriptions and reassembled the envelopes into twelve multicolored square construc-
tions that were presented to twelve audience members to take home, three of the action’s 













participating in the construction of the text” and serving as one of its 
“integral parts”; otherwise, he contends, it remains “strictu senso docu-
mentation.”41 This definition categorically excludes objects left at the 
place of action after its conclusion, which Alekseev likens to “a painting 
created by an artist or a book written by an author.” Here Alekseev 
seems to offer a definition of actions as texts that unfold in the course 
of their realization by the participants and organizers in real time and 
space. Monastyrski’s attempt to expand the location of action from the 
viewers’ singular experience of this unfolding to the manifold possible 
sites and times of the factographic object and its potential encounters 
with anonymous viewers is here countered with a notion of action  
that can be neither separated from the viewers themselves nor con-
tained in an artistic product, like a book or a painting. For Alekseev, 
action exists only in the process of being realized, and the factographic 
document or object acts as the instrument and later index of that 
realization.
In one sense, the significance of this disagreement should not be 
Collective Actions, For G. Kiesewalter (Slogan-1980), April 13, 1980. 
Documentary photograph. (Slogan in the distance.) Image courtesy  
of Andrei Monastyrski. © Collective Actions.
41   Nikita Alekseev, “Kommentarii k kratkomu kommentariiu A. Monastyrskogo” (July 11, 





























42   The first hand-bound volumes of Poezdki za gorod appeared in four copies in the fall of 
1980 under the authorship of Alekseev, Kiesewalter, Monastyrski, and Panitkov. They  
contained documentary materials of collective and individual works from 1975 to 1980  
as well as collectively and individually written interpretive texts.
43   Andrei Monastyrski, “Zamechanie po povodu ‘Kommentariia’ N. Alekseeva” (August 30, 
1979), in Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1, 164–65.
44   Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, “From Faktura to Factography,” October 30 (Autumn 1984): 
94–95, emphasis original.
overstated. Most likely, the bullet-pointed commentaries were written 
as a way of working out some interpretive positions within the group. 
That the commentaries were not included in the publication of the first 
volume of Collective Actions’ documentary and interpretive materials 
(Trips Out of Town) in the autumn of the following year (1980) seems to 
support this reading.42 Moreover, the question of the factographic docu-
ment disappears from the texts after the summer of 1979, even while 
the amount and variety of documents produced in actions increased 
exponentially only months later (in Place of Action). Nevertheless, 
what is significant about this exchange is the way in which it frames 
questions about the nature of action through its relation to the docu-
ment. Questions of temporality and materiality come to the fore, as 
Monastyrski suggests that the duration of an action may be extended 
and multiplied by means of the so-called factographic object, whose 
materiality acquires a symbolic significance (“the semantics of facto-
graphic documentation”) that is independent of the action’s structure 
(what Alekseev calls “the text”). Alekseev’s reticence to concede such 
significance to the materiality of documentation and his insistence  
on the primacy of the unfolding action’s structure point to a funda-
mentally different understanding of actions that would bear on the 
group’s practice in the coming years. In his own response to Alekseev, 
Monastyrski grants Alekseev’s point about materials left at the place of 
action, though this would not put the question to rest definitively.43
Empty actions and Empty photographs
The question of performance documentation in the Soviet context is 
haunted by the postrevolutionary history and theory of photography. 
The rapidly urbanizing and industrializing Soviet society of the 1920s 
saw an urgent need for new forms of collective production, address,  
and distribution. As Benjamin Buchloh has argued, this was a major 
impetus for left artists’ turn to “factographic” images, which he defines 
as “iconic representations for a new mass audience.”44 Artists and 













LEF, championed photography and film as the visual practices most 
suited to the postrevolutionary moment by virtue of their capacity for 
the precise inscription of fact and direct access to reality.45 This dis-
course of transparency and facticity associated with the photographic 
medium became, according to Leah Dickerman, the model for a mode 
of factographic writing championed by these left theorists (calling  
themselves faktoviki, or factists) in the late-1920s project of developing 
new forms of representation “grounded in the reality of contemporary 
Soviet life.”46
Monastyrski has recently explained that his introduction of the 
term factography ( faktografiia) into Collective Actions’ discourse was 
not consciously related to its use in the 1920s and 1930s. The project of 
building Soviet Communism was far from Monastyrski’s interests in 
the 1970s and 1980s.47 It is perhaps because of this association with 
the revolutionary avant-garde and with the postrevolutionary Soviet 
project that photography’s explicit consideration as a medium and  
as a documentary form did not initially figure in Collective Actions’ 
theoretical writings.48 When he finally addresses the group’s use of 
photography in his essay “Seven Photographs” (December 1980), 
Monastyrski sidesteps the language of photographic realism as it had 
been expounded by such theorists as Osip Brik, Aleksandr Rodchenko, 
and Dziga Vertov and turns his attention instead to the “entirely other 
aesthetic reality” that he sees as intrinsic to the different kinds of sec-
ondary documentary materials produced in the course of Collective 
Actions’ work.49 Here Monastyrski returns to some of the questions 
about the materiality and temporality of action raised the previous year 
in his exchange with Alekseev.
45  Leah Dickerman, “The Fact and the Photograph,” October 118 (Fall 2006): 134.
46   Ibid., 135, 138. On literary factography, see “Soviet Factography,” ed. Devin Fore, special 
issue, October 118 (Fall 2006).
47   In correspondence with the author (October 14, 2011), he writes, “I cannot say where the 
word factography came from, but I think that in a sense, I somehow ‘invented’ it (from 
the word ‘fact’), since I did not know the tradition of the 1920s–1930s. Or rather, I knew 
LEF and Novyi LEF and all of these names, but the theme of factography and this word 
. . . I did not know and was not interested in—these were, after all, Soviet problems, 
Communist problems, and I was absolutely uninterested in them.”
48   This issue is, of course, complicated by the different professional and artistic back-
grounds of the group members. As was already seen in the case of Makarevich, these 
identities produced different attitudes toward photographic practice. A fuller examination 
of these positions and how they relate to the representational status of the photographic 
image within Collective Actions’ practice and discourse deserves a fuller examination 
than is possible here.





























As was most clearly manifested in Appearance, actions staged in 
the field encapsulated a complex temporality of anticipation and retro-
spective sense making that raised simple spatiotemporal perception  
to the level of event by calling the viewers’ attention to their own look-
ing. Factographic documents, as they were finally envisioned in the 
exchange of summer 1979, played a constructive role in this respect  
by directing viewer attention back in time precisely at the moment 
when it seemed that the action was just in the process of taking place 
(again, the Documentary Certificate is paradigmatic). Monastyrski 
describes this phenomenon in the preface to the first volume of Trips 
Out of Town:
We should say straightaway that the events of the action are under-
taken in order to “distract the eye.”. . . [I]t is possible to “deceive” 
perception, . . . but then to let the audience understand that “while 
everyone was looking in one direction, the main event was taking 
place in a completely different place”—in this case in the con-
sciousness of the viewers themselves.50
What is implicit in this complex temporal structure is the separation  
of the position of “viewer-participant” engaged in the experience of 
action from the position of the “outside observer,” capable of making 
sense of that experience only after the fact. In essence, each action 
functions to prolong the period of anticipation and direct engagement 
in spatiotemporal perception and put off the formation of the position 
of the “outside observer,” who can only reflect on this experience in a 
mediated way.51 The term that Collective Actions use to describe this 
structure is empty action, which is thus called because “everything that 
the viewer sees at this time (the figures of participants’ movements, 
their clothing, the supplementary objects, etc.) is ‘empty’ of content, 
and is but a means by which consciousness is drawn into the event’s 
construction.”52
50   Andrei Monastyrski, “Predislovie” (June 1980), in Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1, 14. This pref-
ace was originally unsigned in the 1980 version of Poezdki za gorod, though it appears 
signed by Monastyrski in subsequent printings.
51   As Monastyrski explains in the preface, viewers make judgments of interpretation at 
every point in the action, but these judgments turn out to be false, as the primary experi-
ence (opyt) of action is located elsewhere, in consciousness (11).
52   Andrei Monastyrski, Nikolai Panitkov, Nikita Alekseev, and George Kiesewalter, 
“Predislovie k sborniku opisatel’nykh tekstov (Pervyi ‘aprel’skii’ variant predisloviia k 1 













In “Seven Photographs,” Monastyrski clarifies the relationship  
of photographic documentation to action and to the concept of empty 
action. Performing a semiotic analysis heavily tinged with the language 
of Heideggerian philosophy, Monastyrski posits the primary experi-
ence of actions as an “existential essence” (ekzistentsial’naia sushchnost’ 
sobytiia) that is realized through the reception of some “real experi-
ence” (real’nyi opyt) that takes place in the field.53 The empty action, 
he continues, is what accompanies the existential essence on the level 
of “demonstrational relations”—that is, expressed externally in the 
action structure (the invitation, the journey to the field, the figures 
moving in the distance, etc.) and serving as a sign that points to the 
existential essence. The nature of the existential essence, and there- 
fore the aim of the action itself, in Monastyrski’s formulation in this  
essay, is “to create [a] ‘non-arbitrary emptiness,’ to return the ‘non- 
arbitrariness’ of emptiness to the always arbitrarily empty space”  
of the field.54 Quoting from Heidegger’s 1929 lecture “What Is 
Metaphysics?,” Monastyrski likens this condition to the disclosure  
of the “whole of beings in their heretofore concealed strangeness” and 
the revelation of Dasein that takes place in nihilation.55 Without dwell-
ing unnecessarily on the Heideggerian concept of nihilation, we may 
simply note that empty action functions in such a way that when it is 
revealed as such (when the Documentary Certificate is distributed,  
for example), the emptiness it contains, like Rubinstein’s empty text, 
becomes “nonarbitrary,” and in this way points to the existential 
essence of action, which Monastyrski sets beside such profound  
events as the momentary disclosure of Dasein.
Thus the relation of empty action to the existential essence is 
indexical: empty action is both the visible sign and the actual mecha-
nism by which an action’s existential essence is experienced by the 
viewer. The fragment of time-space snatched out of everyday experi-
53   Monastyrski, “Sem’ fotografii,” 113. The connection between Collective Actions’ theories 
of action and Heideggerian philosophy is another subject of much interest that cannot be 
adequately addressed in the present essay, except to say that Heideggerian terms such as 
unveiling, appearance, being-in-the-world, Stimmung, the nothing, and many others form a 
critical reference for some of Collective Actions’ efforts to theorize their practice in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.
54  Ibid., 114.
55   Ibid. The English translation of the quoted text is here taken from “What Is Meta- 






























ence and framed by the action becomes “nonarbitrary” and is experi-
enced as an event.56 Photography poses a potentially destabilizing 
challenge to this circuit, since photography’s indexical operation (the 
precise inscription of facts, what Rosalind Krauss calls, after Barthes, 
the “message without a code”)57 aspires to capture action and fix it in 
the static moment of the document. But as the empty action reminds 
us, an action’s existential essence, which takes place in consciousness, 
is inherently unrepresentable. Monastyrski addresses this problem 
from two directions, jettisoning most documentary photographs to a 
secondary position while raising certain kinds of photographs to the 
level of action. As in the distinction between the evidentiary document 
and the factographic object that prolongs action, Monastyrski posits 
that all documentary photographs fall into two categories: simple docu-
ments that capture the details of the visible world in which the action 
takes place and “empty photographs” that are taken at the moment of 
an essentially unrepresentable act when the viewer’s consciousness is 
engaged in action. Most photographs, according to this scheme, serve 
as secondary documents of all that is not the action, whereas empty 
photographs, by their very emptiness—their very lack of representa-
tion—allow the viewer to experience something like action.58 In this 
way, Monastyrski gives expression to a radically different vision of per-
formance documentation that is no longer caught up in photography’s 
capacity for the precise and objective recording of fact. Rather, the cate-
gory of empty photographs within the corpus of performance docu-
ments is metaphorical. Like Rubinstein’s empty text, the Documentary 
Certificate, or an action in the field, the empty photograph, in its non-
representational emptiness, relinquishes its claims to indexicality and, 
doing so, becomes an event in itself.
56   Recall Rosalind Krauss’s discussion of the shifter as “a sign which is inherently ‘empty,’ 
its signification a function of only this one instance, guaranteed by the existential pres-
ence of just this object. It is the meaningless meaning that is instituted through the 
terms of the index.” See Rosalind Krauss, “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in 
America,” October 3 (Spring 1977): 78.
57   Rosalind Krauss, “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America, Part 2,” October 4 
(Autumn 1977): 59.
58   Monastyrski, “Sem’ fotografii,” 115. Monastyrski illustrates his argument with seven pho-
tographs of empty or nearly empty fields taken at the very moment of the viewers’ experi-
ence of “nonarbitrary emptiness,” as when they suddenly hear the ringing bell in Lieblich 
or when the two figures in Appearance have just appeared in the distance and may or may 













conclusion: action, documEnt, institution
The theoretical formulation of another aesthetic reality outside the  
experience of spatiotemporal action structure in Monastyrski’s “Seven 
Photographs” recalls Alekseev and Monastyrski’s exchange regarding 
factographic documents of the previous summer. While “Seven 
Photographs” does not name the factographic document or facto-
graphic object, its affirmation of the independent aesthetic reality of 
the empty photograph in its own right, rather than as a secondary repre-
sentation of a primary action, strays even further from Alekseev’s strict 
definition of action as the spatiotemporal structure unfolding before an 
audience. In a way, it also responds to Alekseev’s concerns about the 
growing excess of secondary documentation that he felt had begun to 
overshadow the actual experience of actions. This glut of documents, 
Alekseev felt, had begun to bog the actions down in endless discus-
sions and secondary interpretations, creating an oppressive, hermetic 
atmosphere within the group.59 Monastyrski’s invention of the empty 
photograph may be seen as an attempt to rescue the group from drown-
ing in documents through an expanded notion of action that might 
achieve the same existential function as the actions in the field (“the 
reception of some real experience,” akin to the disclosure of Dasein) 
without appealing to the indexical status of the document. In the years 
that followed, Monastyrski and Collective Actions, minus Alekseev, 
would go much further in this direction, exploring the aesthetic realms 
of multimedia archives assembled out of action photographs and vid-
eos, tape recordings of audience impressions, and audio tracks taken 
from radio broadcasts, in a series of outdoor and indoor actions based 
on what Monastyrski now called “factographic discourse.”60
Meanwhile, Alekseev sought to inject the art world with the “dyna-
mism, sharpness, and relevance” that he felt had been missing from 
Collective Actions since the early actions in the field. In the fall of 1982, 
he opened his apartment to the colorful, carnivalesque, all-over instal-
lations of fellow artists in a new venture called the AptArt Gallery that 
expressed his vision of an art world dramatically different from the 
kind of hermetic journeys instigated and eventually institutionalized 
59   The two texts where Alekseev clearly expresses his position against documentation and 
the direction of the group are “O kollektivnykh i individual’nykh aktsiiakh 1976–1980 
gg.” (August–September 1980), in Poezdki za gorod, vol. 1, 113–35; and “Kogda v 1979 
godu . . .” (May 1983), in Poezdki za gorod, vols. 2–3, 119–24.





























by Collective Actions.61 These journeys had served, for a period of about 
five years, as a site where certain concepts central to Moscow conceptu-
alism were articulated through the performative aesthetics of spatio-
temporal actions carried out in the field. As the production of 
documentation shifted from the purely practical to an aesthetic func-
tion, new artistic concepts and possibilities emerged, further expand-
ing the scope of Moscow conceptualist concerns. In the process, this 
shift away from ephemeral, spatiotemporal actions toward an aesthetic 
of documentation and factographic discourse engendered a form of 
group institutionalization that struck some as excessively theoretical 
and virtually impenetrable.62 In exploring the aesthetic possibilities of 
performance through the concepts of action, documentation, and fac-
tography, Collective Actions located some of the deep fault lines hidden 
below the surface of Moscow conceptualism at the cusp of the 1980s.
61   On AptArt and developments in the 1980s, see Sven Gundlakh, “AptArt (Pictures from 
an Exhibition),” A-Ya: Contemporary Russian Art 5 (1983): 3–5; Margarita Tupitsyn, Apt 
Art: Moscow Vanguard in the ’80s (Mechanicsville, MD: Cremona Foundation, 1985); and 
Andrew Solomon, The Irony Tower: Soviet Artists in a Time of Glasnost (New York: Knopf, 
1991).
62   See, for example, the dictionary of theoretical terms developed within the circle and  
compiled by Monastyrski, Slovar’ terminov moskovskoi kontseptual’nyi shkoly (Moscow: 
Ad Marginem, 1999), translated by Octavian Eşanu, accessed August 16, 2012,  
http://www.conceptualism-moscow.org/page?id=198&lang=en.
